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Abstract: The present study investigated the influence of related and unre-
lated emotions on judgments about a news article. An experimental study was 
designed to manipulate both the relatedness of an elicited emotion (i.  e., anger) 
to the news article and processing depth. Following mood and emotion effects 
theory, related anger was expected to have a stronger effect on judgments about 
the media message than unrelated anger. Processing depth was expected to mod-
erate this effect. The results showed a main effect of relatedness and a main effect 
of processing depth, but the interaction effect was not found. Implications of the 
findings for understanding how emotions influence the processing of media 
stimuli are discussed.
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1  Introduction
A crucial topic in media effects research is the influence of emotions on judg-
ments and opinion formation. Previous research has investigated the effects of 
related emotions – that is, emotions which are elicited by, or thematically related 
to, the object or topic which is evaluated – (e.  g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and 
Strack, 1990; Wirth, Schemer, and Matthes, 2010) as well as the effects of unre-
lated emotions – that is, emotions which are elicited by a different source than 
the target object or topic (e.  g., Goodall, Slater and Myers, 2013; Nabi, 2003). Com-
munication scholars have surmised that the relatedness of emotions may be an 
important boundary condition of emotional effects. Nabi (1999) suggested that 
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message- and topic-relevant emotions are likely to have different effects than 
message and topic-irrelevant moods. Kim and Cameron (2011) proposed that 
research on unrelated emotions may be of limited use to understand the effects 
of message-related emotions. However, a systematic comparison of the effects 
of related and unrelated emotions does, to our knowledge, not yet exist. Such a 
comparison is relevant for two reasons. First, because media messages are typi-
cally complex and because media users actively interpret messages, a multitude 
of emotional reference objects emerge during media use (e.  g., actions, events, 
and conditions that are depicted in a media message or construed by the recipi-
ent). Any given emotional response may, thus, have different degrees of related-
ness to specific aspects of a media message and corresponding judgments. There-
fore, relatedness is a particularly important boundary condition in the context 
of media use. Second, communication research has identified a broad range of 
effect sizes (perhaps intensities instead of sizes) when investigating emotional 
effects, including weak (Wirth et al., 2010) as well as moderate to strong effects 
(Kühne, Schemer, Matthes, and Wirth, 2011). A closer inspection of the role of 
emotional relatedness may help to understand why there exists substantial het-
erogeneity in the size of emotional effects.
All in all, a clear understanding of the differential effects of related and unre-
lated emotions as well as their boundary conditions is necessary to be able to 
accurately predict how emotions during media use influence recipients’ judg-
ments. The present study systematically compares the effects of related and unre-
lated anger on judgment formation during media use.
For this purpose, we first review empirical findings on the effects of related 
and unrelated emotions in communication research. Second, we discuss how 
emotional relatedness and its effects are conceptualized in mood and emotion 
theories. Third, we employ these theoretical frameworks to derive hypotheses 
about the effects of the relatedness of anger when forming a judgment about a 
news article. Fourth, the design and results of an experimental study that tested 
our theoretical assumptions are presented. Finally, the implications of the find-
ings for mass media communication and future research are discussed.
Emotional media effects on judgments
In recent years, the investigation of emotional effects has received increasing 
attention in communication research (for a review, see Nabi, 2009; Wirth and 
Schramm, 2005). Particular attention has been paid to negative emotions such as 
anger, sadness, and fear. The focus on negative emotions is the result of two ten-
dencies in communication research. First, pivotal lines of research aim at under-
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standing the effects of negative media contents which are likely to elicit negative 
emotions. For instance, political communication scholars aim at understanding 
the effects of negative campaigning (Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner, 2007), youth 
and media scholars the effects of media violence (Fikkers, Piotrowski, and Valk-
enburg, 2017) and cyberbullying (Sumter, Baumgartner, Valkenburg, and Peter, 
2012), and health scholars the effects of fear appeals (Witte and Allen, 2000). 
Second, negative emotions are often conceived as undesirable media effects that 
warrant special scholarly attention. For instance, scholars of media violence 
are concerned with the effects of exposure to violent media on angry feelings 
(Bushman and Huesmann, 2006) and children’s fear responses to media contents 
(Valkenburg and Piotrowski, 2017). Similarly, political communication scholars 
aim at a better understanding of political cynicism by studying the effects of 
media use on negative emotions (e.  g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1998).
Most research on emotional media effects is rooted in psychological frame-
works (e.  g., Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Within these frameworks, emotions are 
defined more narrowly than in lay language, and the narrow conceptualization 
is typically distinguished from moods. In comparison to emotions, moods have 
a longer duration and lower intensity, and they are more diffuse (Forgas, 1995; 
Frijda, 1993). Moods are more diffuse than emotions because they are not related 
to a specific stimulus (e.  g., event or object), while emotions typically constitute 
responses to a specific stimulus. Accordingly, moods are mainly characterized 
by their valence (i.  e., positivity or negativity), whereas emotions have a more 
complex structure, as they are characterized by multiple appraisals of a specific 
stimulus (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988). For instance, anger should be elicited 
if one thinks that an actor is responsible for a negative event, which the actor 
brought about intentionally or through reckless behavior, and if one believes 
one has adequate resources to cope with the situation. Thus, valence is but one 
of the different components of an emotion. Both emotions and moods are sum-
marized under the broader term affects or affective states (e.  g., Forgas, 1995; 
Frijda, 1993).
Influences of affective states on judgments are well-corroborated in commu-
nication research. One strand of research has investigated the effects of related 
emotions. In this perspective, emotions are typically regarded as response states 
that explain the effects of media contents on judgments related to the media 
content (Valkenburg and Peter, 2013). That is, emotions mainly function as medi-
ators of media effects (Nabi, 2003). For instance, Goodall et al. (2013) investigated 
fear and anger responses to news stories about car accidents. They found that fear 
and anger mediate the effects of news stories on the causal attributions regarding 
car accidents. Similarly, in current framing effects research (Kühne, Weber, and 
Sommer, 2015; Lecheler, Schuck, and de Vreese, 2013), emotions are regarded as 
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mechanisms that explain the effects of news frames on attitudes, and in health 
communication, emotions function as mediators of the effects of fear appeals on 
attitudes and behaviors (e.  g., Das, de Wit, and Stroebe, 2003).
A second line of research focused on the effects of moods and emotions which 
are not in any way connected to the media content which is to be evaluated. Unre-
lated moods and emotions are typically regarded as predictors of judgments about 
media contents or as moderators of media effects. A study which exemplifies the 
effects of unrelated moods on judgments was conducted by Wirth et al. (2010). In 
their experimental study, they induced positive and neutral moods by showing 
people humorous or neutral television advertising. Individuals in the good-mood 
condition judged the subsequent news stories more positively than those in the 
neutral-mood condition, even though the mood induction – the exposure to the 
humorous or neutral advertisements – was not associated to the subsequent atti-
tude object (a news story). Lecheler, Schuck, de Vreese, Nelson, and de Lange 
(2012) investigated the moderating role of unrelated moods in framing effects. 
In their experimental study, they first measured participants’ current mood and 
then presented them with either a speech advocacy or a speech opposition frame. 
They found that moods did indeed moderate the framing effect on the opinion 
toward free speech: The framing only affected the attitudes of those participants 
who were in a bad mood.
Explaining the effects of related and unrelated emotions
Even though previous research has found evidence for the effects of related and 
unrelated emotions, a systematic comparison of the differential impact of the two 
types of emotions does, to our knowledge, not yet exist. The likely reasons for 
this research gap are that both related and unrelated emotions have been shown 
to influence judgments and that main psychological theories suggest that both 
related and unrelated affect can influence judgments.
The affect-as-information approach (Schwarz, 1990) and the affect infusion 
model (Forgas, 1995) propose that moods have a valence-congruent effect on 
judgments. That is, positive moods lead to more positive evaluations of a certain 
object, theme, or content, whereas negative moods lead to more negative judg-
ments. In the appraisal tendency framework (Lerner and Keltner, 2000), an emo-
tion’s valence is one of multiple determinants of judgments. The specific effect 
of an emotion depends on the particular pattern of appraisals that character-
izes the emotion. Thus, each emotion is assumed to have idiosyncratic effects 
on judgments (e.  g., Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischoff, 2003). For instance, 
anger, in line with its characteristic core appraisals, promotes the perception that 
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an event is negative, predictable, under human control, and brought about by 
others (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Accordingly, anger typically increases the pref-
erence for punitive measures and negative attitudes toward actors (Weiner, 1995). 
Importantly, the appraisal tendency framework suggests that the effects of an 
emotion are restricted to judgments that are related to the emotion’s appraisals 
(Han, Lerner, and Keltner, 2007). For instance, anger should have strong effects 
on evaluations of actors because its appraisals emphasize human control and 
responsibility, whereas other emotions with alternative appraisal tendencies 
(e.  g., sadness) should have weaker effects on the evaluation of actors (Lerner 
and Keltner, 2000).
Two aspects of the above theories are noteworthy. First, the models agree 
on the explanation of affective influences. Namely, moods and emotions are 
assumed to influence judgments by activating mood- or emotion-congruent cog-
nitions or by functioning as judgment heuristics. Second, the models suggest 
that these explanatory mechanisms can, in principle, be triggered by related and 
unrelated affect (Forgas, 1995; Han et al., 2007).
However, a close reading of the same theories indicates that the relatedness 
of an emotion can still play a decisive role in determining affective influences. An 
exact discussion of emotional relatedness first requires a clear definition of the 
concept. The differentiation between related and unrelated affect has its roots 
in social and emotion psychology (e.  g., Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Perrott and 
Bodenhausen, 2002). Here, an emotion is regarded as related or connected to 
a judgment when it was elicited by the object which is evaluated. For instance, 
anger is related to the judgment of a person when characteristics or behaviors of 
that person elicited the anger. In contrast, an emotion is unrelated to a judgment 
when it was elicited by another object than the object which is evaluated. For 
instance, if someone is angry because they lost their job and the anger influences 
their evaluation of another person, this is an effect of an unrelated emotion. This 
definition suggests that relatedness is a dichotomous variable: Either the emotion 
was elicited by the object which is evaluated or not. However, a more plausible 
perspective is that emotions may be more or less related to a judgment, and that 
relatedness is a continuum (see Kühne, 2012). An emotion is fully related when it 
was elicited by the object under evaluation. However, some degree of relatedness 
may still exist when the emotion was elicited by an object which is conceptually 
similar or thematically related (see Collins and Loftus, 1975) to the object under 
evaluation. For instance, if an individual is angry about the legislative perfor-
mance of the president, the anger may be related to the performance of congress, 
too.
The degree of relatedness of an emotion is likely to influence the strength of 
the emotional effect because individuals strive for accurate judgments and try 
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to correct evaluations when they perceive them to be biased. Accordingly, when 
individuals notice that their judgments are influenced by an unrelated emotion, 
they should try to correct for this influence by de-biasing their judgment (Petty, 
Wegener, and White, 1998; Schwarz, 1990). Lerner and Keltner (2000, p. 489) 
suggest that “conscious monitoring of one’s judgment process will lead individ-
uals to focus on judgment-relevant information and discount such judgment-ir-
relevant information as incidental affect”. Discounting an incidental, that is, 
unrelated emotion consists in filtering out a perceived emotional impact on 
judgments and aims at forming an unbiased evaluation. Thus, the emotion itself 
is not reduced (as in emotion regulation), but the (irrelevant) emotional infor-
mation is not incorporated into, or removed from, the judgment. Discounting 
depends on the presumed influence of the unrelated emotion on a judgement 
(Petty et al., 1998).
Because discounting necessitates the conscious monitoring of one’s judg-
ment process, as Lerner and Keltner (2000) point out, it constitutes a cognitively 
demanding task. It not only requires the individual to be able to identify the relat-
edness of an emotional state to a judgment but to also assess the scope of the bias 
and to adjust the judgment. Accordingly, correction processes should only take 
place when individuals have ample cognitive capacities available and when they 
are motivated to reflect upon a judgment (Albarracín and Kumkale, 2003; Ottati 
and Isbell, 1996), that is, when they employ the central processing route (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986) or process substantively (Forgas, 1995).
Because discounting emotions requires ample cognitive resources, related 
and unrelated emotions should have similar effects when individuals process 
heuristically but distinct effects when individuals process substantively (Kühne, 
2012). Because individuals are not able to assess the relatedness of an emotion to 
a judgment under heuristic processing, related as well as unrelated emotions can 
exert an effect. In contrast, when individuals process substantively, they should 
be able to recognize to what degree an emotion is related or unrelated to a judg-
ment. The more closely related an emotion is to a judgment, the higher is its diag-
nostic value for the individual and its impact on the judgment. In contrast, the 
weaker the link of an emotion is to a judgment, the less weight the emotion will 
have in the judgment process and discounting becomes more likely.
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The differential effects of related and unrelated anger  
on the processing of news
In the preceding sections, we have outlined why related and unrelated emotions 
should have differential effects on judgments. Below, we apply this theoretical 
rationale to derive hypotheses about the effects of related and unrelated anger 
on judgments in response to a news article. We study anger because it is one of 
the most studied negative emotions (e.  g., Kühne, 2012) and because it plays a 
crucial role in communication theories such as the general aggression model 
(Anderson and Bushman, 2002) and the cognitive functional model (Nabi, 1999). 
News articles are focused on for four reasons. First, news is a pivotal category of 
media messages, which are frequently investigated in communication research 
(Potter, 2009). Second, news is often emotionally charged (Gross, 2008; Potter, 
2009), and emotional influences on judgments related to news may thus regu-
larly occur. Third, anger should play a particularly important role in judgments 
related to news. News reports regularly discuss the responsibility of actors and 
suggest certain attributions of responsibility and evaluations of actors (Semetko 
and Valkenburg, 2000). Anger is a crucial emotion in news contexts because, on 
the one hand, it can be elicited by attributions of responsibility within news and, 
on the other hand, because it is likely to influence attributions of responsibil-
ity and evaluations of actors (e.  g., Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Fourth, emotional 
biases in the processing of news can be regarded as particularly problematic. A 
core function assigned to news is to inform the public about relevant issues and 
facilitate rational opinion formation (e.  g., Curran, 2005). Against this backdrop, 
biasing influence of ephemeral emotions on evaluations of political issues is typ-
ically, but not always, regarded as problematic (see Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, 
and Rucht, 2002).
We first propose that individuals are more likely to form anger-congruent 
judgments about the content of a news story when they experience related anger 
than when they experience unrelated anger. More specifically, a news story which 
addresses the potential wrongdoings of an organization should result in more 
negative attitudes toward the organization when people experience related anger. 
The reason for this is that the appraisal tendencies of anger (which emphasize 
human control and responsibility over a negative event) should exert a stronger 
effect on the attitude toward the organization when the experienced anger is 
related than when the experienced anger is unrelated. We thus hypothesize:
H1: When being exposed to a news story about the potential wrongdoings of an organiza-
tion, readers will form a more negative attitude toward the organization when they experi-
ence related anger than when they experience unrelated anger.
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Second, we suggest that the differential effects of related and unrelated anger on 
the attitude toward the organization should be moderated by processing depth. 
When readers process the news article heuristically, they may not be able to eval-
uate the relatedness of their anger to the evaluation of the organization. Thus, 
readers should not discount unrelated anger, and related and unrelated anger 
should result in similar attitudes. In contrast, substantive processing of the news 
article allows readers to evaluate the relatedness of their anger and to discount 
unrelated anger. We hypothesize:
H2a: The effect of the relatedness of anger on the attitude toward the organization is mod-
erated by processing depth. Under heuristic processing, the effect of relatedness will be 
smaller than under substantive processing.
The proposed interaction pattern implies that readers who experience unre-
lated anger and process substantively will, in comparison to other readers, have 
more positive attitudes toward the organization mentioned in the news article. 
The reason for this is that only readers who experience unrelated anger and who 
process substantively will discount their anger and not use it when evaluating the 
organization.
H2b: Individuals who experience unrelated anger and process substantively will evaluate 
the organization more positively than individuals who experience unrelated anger and 
process heuristically or than individuals who experience related anger and either process 
substantively or heuristically.
2  Methods
An online experiment with undergraduate students was conducted. The exper-
iment employed a 2x2-factorial design. The independent variables were relat-
edness (unrelated anger vs. related anger) and processing depth (heuristic vs. 
substantive processing). The dependent variable was the attitude toward a travel 
agency that was described in a news article.
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students at a large European university. They 
were recruited through a website and via e-mail. Thirty-five participants were 
excluded because they did not complete the questionnaire. Moreover, 16 partic-
ipants were excluded because they did not spend an adequate amount of time 
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on reading the news article. More specifically, they were excluded because their 
reading time was below 120 seconds (the minimum time to properly read the 
article as determined by the authors) or above 472 seconds (i.  e., two standard 
deviations above the mean). Two participants were excluded because they had 
negative values on the time counter, which is likely to be the result of a techni-
cal failure. Thus, 151 participants remained in the sample (119 females, 32 males; 
M
age
 = 23.91, SD = 8.93). As reward for their participation, they could choose to 
either obtain credits or participate in a raffle for two movie tickets.
Design and procedure
The study was conducted in German. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions (35 in related/substantive condition, 40 in related/heu-
ristic condition, 34 in unrelated/substantive condition, 42 in unrelated/heuristic 
condition). At the start of the experiment, the participants were asked to write 
about a personal life experience in which they had received unfair treatment 
either during a journey (related anger condition) or during an interpersonal inter-
action in everyday life (unrelated anger condition). Half of the participants were 
advised to read the article carefully (substantive processing), and the other half 
were asked to merely skim the article (heuristic processing). Participants then 
read an article about a travel agency. The article was fictitious to ensure that none 
of the participants had any preexisting attitude toward the agency. The article’s 
style and formatting emulated a real news article.
After reading the article, the participants were asked about their attitude 
toward the travel agency. Participants’ emotions, processing depth, and the relat-
edness of their personal life experience to the stimulus were subsequently meas-
ured. To assess the quality of the news article, participants were asked to indicate 
their perception of the professional workmanship and ambiguity of the article. 
Then, participants completed a knowledge test. Finally, participants selected 
the reward for their participation (course credits or chance of winning cinema 
tickets), and they were debriefed.
Stimulus materials and manipulation
News stimulus. A realistically looking news article was created, which had to 
fulfil several criteria. Emotional influences on judgments mainly arise when the 
judgment is not predetermined by existing attitudes (Forgas, 1995). Accordingly, 
we opted for a non-political issue because political judgments often have a strong 
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attitude base and are determined by ideological beliefs. To allow for the induction 
of related anger, a topic was required which related to participants’ personal life 
experiences. Because all participants presumably have some personal experience 
with traveling, the news article described a travel agency that was supposedly 
involved in minor criminal activity: The travel agency attracted attention by offer-
ing extreme dumping prices for all-inclusive journeys. A closer look at the travel 
agency showed similar incidents in various travel destinations (e.  g., Tunisia, 
Greece, and Turkey). Waiting for hours at the airport, tourists were coerced into 
visiting marketing events before transportation to the hotels. Therefore, the travel 
agency was accused of making illegal agreements with merchants and market-
ing organizations. However, these were merely allegations, with little actual evi-
dence, and it was unclear whether the agency’s actions had actually caused any 
damage to the tourists. Overall, the article thus included a high degree of ambigu-
ity, which allows for emotional influences on judgments (Forgas, 1995). Perceived 
ambiguity and professional workmanship were found to be sufficiently high to 
ensure the possibility of emotional influence.¹
Induction of related and unrelated anger. Participants were instructed 
to describe a personal experience in which they had received unfair treatment 
either during a journey, with examples of possible events such as airplane delays 
or poor organization by travel agencies (related condition), or during a human 
interaction in everyday life, such as bad or unfair treatment by a superior, family, 
or friends (unrelated condition). According to appraisal theories (e.  g., Lerner et 
al., 2003), anger is caused when a negative event occurs due to someone else’s 
responsibility. It was assumed that describing unfair treatment (i.  e., a bad event 
that happened to the participants due to another person’s responsibility or that of 
an organization) would provoke anger. Because the main theme of the article was 
a travel agency, anger caused by a bad travel experience was thematically related 
to the article, while anger due to a human interaction in everyday life was themat-
ically unrelated to the article. It is important to note that the manipulation only 
aimed at eliciting different levels of anger relatedness but not of anger intensity 
across the experimental groups.
1 Ambiguity and professionality were both measured using five indicators and a 5-point Likert 
scale (1= not at all to 5 = very much). The indicators of the article’s professionality formed a reli-
able measure (α = .86). They were averaged to form a total score of professionality. A reliability 
analysis revealed that two indicators of ambiguity were responsible for the insufficient reliabili-
ty. After excluding the two indicators, the remaining three indicators resulted in a reliable meas-
ure of ambiguity (α = .65), and a mean score was calculated. Inspecting the distribution of the 
two total scores revealed a mean professionality score of 3.45 (SD = 0.78) and a mean ambiguity 
score of 3.01 (SD = 0.91).
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To test the induction of related and unrelated anger, a pilot study was con-
ducted with eleven participants (related condition: 6, unrelated condition: 5). 
Anger and sadness were measured (see below) immediately after the recount-
ing of the personal-life experience. Sadness was measured as a control varia-
ble: Because a negative travel (or personal) experience could potentially elicit 
sadness, it may function as a confounder. Results showed that participants in the 
related (M = 3.26, SD = 1.02) and the unrelated condition (M = 3.14, SD = .32) expe-
rienced about the same degree of anger (part. η2 =  .01). Moreover, participants 
experienced more anger (M = 3.21, SD =  .75) than sadness (M = 2.66, SD = 1.38) 
(part. η2 = .10). However, it is important to note that recalling life events that elic-
ited anger also seems to have elicited sadness. This suggests that sadness should 
be considered as a control variable in the main study (see also discussion of 
manipulation check in main study).
Processing depth. Participants in the substantive processing condition were 
told to read the following article carefully with all the time they needed. They 
were also informed that the topic was highly important and that they should thus 
consider the arguments carefully. Participants in the heuristic processing condi-
tion were led to believe that they had a limited amount of time to read the article, 
and they were instructed to just skim through the text.
Measures
Anger and sadness. To measure anger and sadness we adjusted the German scale 
by Renaud and Unz (2006) by adding additional indicators of the two emotions. 
The resulting set of indicators included eight adjectives referring to anger and five 
adjectives referring to sadness. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they currently felt specific emotions on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = not 
at all to 5 = very much. In contrast to the pilot study, emotions were not meas-
ured immediately after the emotion induction but after the measurement of the 
dependent variable (i.  e., the attitude toward the travel agency). This approach was 
chosen because measuring emotional responses via self-reports can make individ-
uals aware of their emotional state, which can artificially trigger discounting pro-
cesses (Ottati and Isbell, 1996). A principal axis factor analysis with oblique rota-
tion revealed that 11 of the 13 emotional adjectives loaded correctly on an “anger” 
and a “sadness” factor. Angry, indignant, mad, offended, irate, annoyed, and upset 
loaded on the factor “anger”. The items sad, distressed, hurt, and unhappy loaded 
on “sadness”. The items peevish and concerned did not load clearly on either 
of these two factors and were excluded when mean indices of anger (M = 2.04, 
SD = 0.95, α = .91) and sadness (M = 1.86, SD = 0.87, α = .85) were calculated.
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Relatedness to the stimulus. To check whether the description of an expe-
rience during a journey was more related to the stimulus than the description of 
an experience in an everyday interaction, we developed a measure of relatedness, 
which included five items. Participants indicated their response on a 5-point 
Likert scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much. An example of an item is “The 
topic in the article reminded me of my described personal life experience”. The 
scale was reliable (M = 1.81, SD = 0.93, α = .85).
Involvement. To check whether the processing depth differed between 
the substantive and heuristic processing groups, we used an involvement scale 
(Schemer, Matthes and Wirth, 2007) with three items (e.  g., “I have read the article 
attentively”). Participants could answer on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
1 = not at all to 5 = very much. The scale was reliable (M = 3.34, SD = 0.91, α = .81). 
A knowledge test was conducted, which functioned as a further proxy of process-
ing depth. The measure was based on four open questions. The answers were 
coded from 1 (not at all correct) to 3 (completely correct); therefore, total scores 
could range from 4 to 12 (M = 8.13, SD = 1.90). A second person coded 10 % of 
the questions. Cohen’s Kappa indicated that the intercoder reliability (κ =  .83) 
was acceptable (Greve and Ventura, 1997). As a third indicator of involvement, 
the time participants needed to read the article (M = 232.92 seconds, SD = 61.05 
seconds) was measured.
Familiarity with the issue. To ensure that differences in familiarity with the 
issue would not produce differences in judging the travel agency, we measured 
participants’ familiarity with all-inclusive journeys. The item was “Are you famil-
iar with the topic of all-inclusive journeys?” (Yes/No).
Attitudes toward the travel agency. Attitudes toward the travel agency 
described in the news article were measured using ten items constructed for this 
study. The participants could indicate their response on a 5-point Likert scale, 
which ranged from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much. An example of a positive item is 
“I would book a journey with this travel agency”, and an example of a negative 
item is “I would not recommend this travel agency to my friends”. The scale was 
reliable (M = 2.29, SD = 0.67, α = .85).
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3  Results
Manipulation checks
Anger. All analyses were conducted in SPSS 25. A two-way ANOVA with relat-
edness and processing depth as independent variables and anger as depend-
ent variable was conducted. Because Levene’s test indicated heteroskedasticity 
(p  =  .005), heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation (HC4) was used (Darling-
ton and Hayes, 2016).² The anger scores for the related anger group (M = 2.03, 
SD = 0.97) did not differ significantly from those for the unrelated anger group 
(M = 2.05, SD = 0.93): t(3) = 0.25, p = .806, part. η2 =.00. Nor did the anger scores 
differ significantly between the substantive processing group (M = 2.00, SD = 0.94) 
and the heuristic processing group (M = 2.08, SD = 0.96): t(3) = 0.51, p = .608, part. 
η2 =.00. Notably, a significant interaction between relatedness and processing 
depth emerged: t(3) = –2.03, p = .044, part. η2 =.03. However, because a series of 
pairwise comparisons (via planned contrasts with HC4-estimation) revealed no 
significant differences between the experimental conditions, we can assume that 
similar levels of anger were induced across the experimental conditions.
Sadness. A two-way ANOVA with relatedness and processing depth as inde-
pendent variables and sadness as dependent variables was conducted. Because 
of heteroskedasticity (p  =  .006), HC4-estimation was used. In contrast to our 
expectations, we found that relatedness decreased the intensity of sadness: 
t(3) = 2.44, p = .016, part. η2 =.04. Processing did not have a main effect on sadness: 
t(3) = –0.217, p =  .828, part. η2 =  .00. There existed a significant interaction on 
sadness: t(3) = –3.01, p = .003, part. η2 = 06. The disordinal interaction seems to be 
the result of sadness being higher in the unrelated (M = 2.26, SD = 1.06) than the 
related condition (M = 1.50, SD = 0.65) when individual process substantively, and 
the unrelated (M = 1.81, SD = 0.82) and the related condition (M = 1.89, SD = 0.81) 
producing similar levels of sadness when individuals process heuristically.
A dependent samples t-test confirmed that participants experienced more 
anger (M =  2.04, SD = 0.95) than sadness (M =  1.86, SD = 0.87): t(150) =  2.57, 
p = .011. The manipulation check showed that participants experienced similar 
2 Standard ANOVA uses effect coding. However, in SPSS 25, dummy coding is used when an 
ANOVA (UNIANOVA) with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (such as HC4) is esti-
mated. To increase the comparability between OLS- and HC4-estimates, we used the LMATRIX 
sub-command to implement effect coding with HC4-estimation. Respective contrast codes were 
derived from the contrast coefficient matrix, which can be obtained with the PRINT TEST(LMA-
TRIX) sub-command.
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levels of anger across the experimental conditions and that they experienced 
more anger than sadness. However, the manipulation check also revealed that 
sadness unexpectedly differed across the experimental conditions. Consequently, 
we conducted two tests per hypothesis: a test with and a test without sadness as 
covariate. As the tests virtually produced the same pattern of significant findings, 
we report the results of the tests with sadness as a covariate. Results of the tests 
without a covariate are described if discrepancies exist. Moreover, we address 
implications of the differing levels of sadness in the discussion section.
Manipulation check for relatedness. A two-way ANOVA with the related-
ness and processing depth as independent variables and perceived relatedness 
as the dependent variable was conducted. HC4-estimation was used to account 
for heteroskedasticity (p < .001). As predicted, the related anger group (M = 2.04, 
SD = 1.11) perceived the described personal-life experience to be significantly 
more related to the content of the article than the unrelated anger group 
(M = 1.58, SD = 0.64): t(3) = –3.01, p = .003, part. η2 =.06. The substantive pro-
cessing group (M = 1.81, SD = 0.94) did not differ significantly from the heuris-
tic processing group (M = 1.80, SD = 0.93) in emotional relatedness: t(3) = 0.04, 
p = .971, part. η2 =.00. No significant interaction emerged: t(3) = –0.72, p = .473, 
part. η2 =.00.
The results show that individuals who described a bad experience during a 
journey experienced anger that was thematically more related to the described 
travel agency than anger of individuals who described a bad everyday interac-
tion. Processing depth had no significant influence on perceived relatedness. 
Therefore, manipulation of relatedness was successful.
Manipulation check for processing depth. Two-way ANOVAs were con-
ducted with relatedness and processing depth as independent variables and with 
involvement, knowledge, and reading time as the dependent variables. Involve-
ment (p = .304), knowledge (p = .110), and reading time (p = .755) did not exhibit 
heteroskedasticity.
The mean values of involvement did not differ significantly between the 
related anger group (M = 3.28, SD = 0.85) and the unrelated anger group (M = 3.40, 
SD = 0.90): F(1, 147) =  1.17, p =  .280, part. η2 = 01. In contrast, the substantive 
processing group (M  =  3.63, SD  =  0.80) had a significantly higher processing 
depth than the heuristic processing group (M = 3.09, SD = 0.93): F(1, 147) = 14.48, 
p = .000, part. η2 = .09. There existed no significant interaction: F(1, 147) = 1.66, 
p = .200, part. η2 = .01.
The mean values for knowledge about the article did not differ between the 
related anger group (M = 7.93, SD = 1.98) and the unrelated anger group (M = 8.32, 
SD = 1.82): F(1, 147) = 1.83, p = .178, part. η2 = 01. In contrast, the substantive pro-
cessing group (M = 8.51, SD = 2.04) scored significantly higher than the heuristic 
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processing group (M = 7.80, SD = 1.72): F(1, 147) = 5.36, p = .022, part. η2 = .04. There 
existed no significant interaction: F(1, 147) = 0.47, p =.495, part. η2 = .00.
The mean values for reading time did not differ between the related anger 
group (M  =  228.91, SD  =  61.70) and the unrelated anger group (M  =  236.88, 
SD = 60.54): F(1, 147) = 1.23, p =  .270, part. η2 = 01. In contrast, the substantive 
processing group (M = 257.80, SD = 61.66) scored significantly higher than the 
heuristic processing group (M = 211.99, SD = 52.34): F(1, 147) = 24.81, p < .001, part. 
η2 = .14. There existed no significant interaction: F(1, 147) = 2.90, p = .091, part. 
η2 = .02.
The results indicate that the participants who were advised to read the 
article carefully processed the information more elaborately than those who were 
advised to skim through the article. Therefore, the manipulation of processing 
depth was successful.
Check of familiarity with the issue
χ2-tests were conducted to test whether there existed differences across the exper-
imental conditions with regard to familiarity with all-inclusive journeys. There 
were no significant differences with regard to participants’ familiarity with the 
topic: χ2(3) =  1.19, p =  .756. The result of the χ2–tests suggest that there are no 
differences in familiarity with all-inclusive journeys across the experimental con-
ditions that may account for differences in the outcome variable.
In summary, the results of the manipulation checks showed that all par-
ticipants felt a comparable level of anger when reading the article and that the 
manipulations of relatedness and processing depth succeeded. Moreover, issue 
familiarity was comparable across experimental conditions. However, because 
levels of sadness differed across experimental conditions, sadness was included 
as a covariate in the hypothesis tests.
Hypothesis tests
A two-way ANCOVA was conducted to test the effects of relatedness and process-
ing depth on attitudes toward the travel agency (Hypotheses 1 and 2a), while 
controlling for sadness. Levene’s test indicated heteroskedasticity (p < .001) and, 
thus, HC4-estimation was employed. There was a main effect of relatedness on 
attitudes toward the travel agency: t(3) = 2.07, p = .040, part. η2 =.03. The unrelated 
anger group (M = 2.39, SD = 0.75) judged the travel agency significantly better 
than the related anger group (M = 2.19, SD = 0.57). There was also a main effect of 
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processing depth on attitudes toward the travel agency: t(3) = –2.13, p = .035, part. 
η2 =.03. Participants who processed substantively (M = 2.41, SD = 0.81) judged the 
travel agency significantly better than participants who processed heuristically 
(M = 2.18, SD = 0.51). There was no interaction between relatedness and process-
ing depth: t(3) = –1.55, p = .124, part. η2 =.02. The results provide evidence in favor 
of Hypothesis 1: Relatedness influenced the attitude toward the travel agency. 
Hypothesis 2a was not confirmed: Processing depth did not moderate the effect 
of relatedness.
Hypothesis 2b posited that the travel agency should be evaluated more posi-
tively by participants who both experienced unrelated anger and processed sub-
stantively. To compare the corresponding experimental condition with the other 
conditions, we conducted planned comparisons (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1985) 
with sadness as control variable. Because of heteroskedasticity, HC4-estimation 
was employed. As shown in Figure 1, the analysis revealed that the unrelated anger / 
substantive processing group evaluated the travel agency significantly better com-
pared to the other groups: t(1) = 2.51, p =.013. We also conducted planned pairwise 
comparisons between the unrelated anger / substantive processing group and 
each other group. The unrelated anger / substantive processing group (M = 2.61, 
SD = 0.96) evaluated the travel agency more positively than the related anger / sub-
stantive processing group, t(1) = 2.10, p =.038 (M = 2.23, SD = 0.61)³; the unrelated 
anger / heuristic processing group, t(1) = 2.31, p =.022 (M = 2.21, SD = 0.47); and the 






























Figure 1: Attitude toward travel agency across experimental conditions.
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related anger / heuristic processing group, t(1) = 2.55, p =.012 (M = 2.15, SD = 0.55). 
Overall, the analyses provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2b.
Finally, because our manipulation check indicated that sadness differed 
across experimental conditions and to provide additional evidence for the pro-
posed mechanism of affect discounting, we conducted a set of ad-hoc analyses. In 
the related and the unrelated anger condition, partial correlations between anger 
and sadness, on the one hand, and the attitude toward the travel agency, on the 
other hand, were estimated. The second emotion and the processing condition 
functioned as covariates. If anger was the crucial determinant of attitudes toward 
the travel agency and if this effect was dependent on emotional relatedness, we 
would expect a significant effect of anger in the related emotion condition but not 
in the unrelated emotion condition, and no effect of sadness in either condition. 
The expected pattern was confirmed by the analyses: Anger led to a more neg-
ative attitude in the related emotion condition (r = –.32, p = .005) but not in the 
unrelated emotion condition (r = .03, p = .834), whereas sadness had no effect in 
either condition (r = .08, p = .484; r = –.03, p = .807).
4  Discussion
This study investigated whether the relatedness of emotions affected participants’ 
judgments of a fictional travel agency. A main effect of relatedness was found: 
Individuals who felt unrelated anger judged the travel agency more positively 
than individuals who felt related anger. This finding corroborates the notion that 
the reference object of an emotional experience and, accordingly, the relatedness 
of an emotional experience to a judgment is a crucial variable to understanding 
emotional influences on judgments.
Furthermore, our expectation that processing depth would influence the 
effect of the relatedness of anger was partially confirmed: Although we did not 
find a significant interaction effect of emotional relatedness and processing 
depth on the evaluation of the travel agency, the experimental groups signifi-
cantly differed in their evaluation of the agency: Participants who experienced 
related anger and who processed substantively evaluated the agency more pos-
itively. This finding is in line with our theoretical assumption that individuals 
will be able to identify and discount influences of unrelated emotional states if 
they sufficiently reflect, whereas unrelated emotions influenced judgments when 
individuals process heuristically.
A possible explanation for the missing interaction between emotional relat-
edness and processing depth may be that negative affect promoted relatively 
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high levels of processing depth in all conditions. Research has shown that 
moods and emotions impact processing depth and that negative affect often 
promotes more elaborate information processing (e.  g., Bless and Schwarz, 
1999). Accordingly, anger may have overridden the manipulation of processing 
depth and prompted more substantive processing, which allowed participants 
in both processing conditions to evaluate the relatedness of their emotions and 
employ discounting if necessary. In line with this explanation, the knowledge 
test showed significantly less knowledge for those who processed heuristically, 
but the values were still high, indicating that these individuals did not process 
completely heuristically. Future studies should investigate how the valence of 
emotional responses affects the likelihood of emotion discounting. Since nega-
tive emotions typically increase processing depth (Forgas, 1995), it is plausible 
to assume that discounting will be more prevalent when one experiences (unre-
lated) negative affect.
Our findings on the differential effects of related and unrelated emotions 
suggest that communication theories can be refined by considering the refer-
ence objects and relatedness of emotions. Identifying reference objects is rel-
evant because plenty of them exist during media use: Media stimuli, such as 
news articles, address a variety of issue aspects (e.  g., problems, perpetrators, 
victims, actors that can resolve the problem); media users can switch between 
different frames of reference (e.  g., focus on the media content or the situation 
of the media use) (Wirth and Schramm, 2007); and individuals actively construe 
reference objects when processing a stimulus (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988). 
Thus, media users may, for instance, be angry about a societal problem men-
tioned in an article; about the solutions political actors propose; about the way 
a journalist depicts an issue; or because they perceive the proposed solutions to 
the problem as an attack on their values. Identifying reference objects of emo-
tions within media messages will help to evaluate which judgments are the likely 
subject of emotional influences. For instance, anger in response to a journalist 
should primarily influence evaluations of the journalist, and anger in response 
to a societal problem should primarily influence evaluations of the societal 
problem. At the same time, emotional spillover effects are possible, and emo-
tional relatedness is an important variable to understand the strength of these 
effects. For instance, anger in response to a societal problem is related to political 
and economic actors that are responsible for the problem but not so much to the 
journalist who discusses the issue. Thus, anger in response to a societal problem 
is more likely to affect judgments of actors involved than judgments of the jour-
nalist. All in all, identifying reference objects and the relatedness of emotions to 
certain judgments will benefit the explanatory and predictive power of commu-
nication  theories.
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A series of limitations of the present study should be considered. First, we 
did not measure the process of emotion discounting directly in the present study. 
Albeit we can thus only make inferences about the psychological mechanism, 
these inferences are well grounded in existing theory and in the specific pattern 
of empirical results: The related and the unrelated emotion condition differ in the 
relatedness and not the intensity of the elicited anger, and, as shown in the ad-hoc 
analyses, anger is only associated with the attitude toward the travel agency in 
the related emotion condition. Still, we cannot fully preclude alternative theo-
retical explanations for the attitudinal differences. Notably, emotion regulation 
theory suggests that individuals can down-regulate emotional experiences if nec-
essary (e.  g., Gross, 2002). Individuals may have noticed that their emotions were 
not relevant for the judgment at hand and thus decided to regulate their emo-
tional experiences. However, this hypothesis does not seem to be corroborated by 
our data because there were no differences in anger intensity across experimental 
decisions. Thus, affect discounting, at this point in time, still seems to provide 
the most plausible explanation for our findings. Moreover, it should be noted that 
an increasing number of researchers voice concern regarding the measurement 
of mechanisms in experimental research (Pirlott and MacKinnon, 2016; Stone-
Romero and Rosopa, 2008). Accordingly, the mediation models which are typ-
ically employed in experimental research do not allow for causal analyses of 
psychological mechanisms, and psychological mechanisms can often be hardly 
measured in a valid way. The latter is specifically true for affective and automatic 
processes, such as emotional discounting: It may be possible to observe the out-
comes of such processes, but valid indicators of the process itself are difficult to 
assess. Nonetheless, future research should try to learn more about the process of 
emotional discounting. Possibly, more can be learned about this process by inves-
tigating the boundary conditions that may affect emotional discounting (such as 
affective orientation, which is an individual’s tendency to use emotions to form 
judgments, or topic-related cognitive schemata, which may influence how indi-
viduals evaluate the relatedness of an emotional experience) (Booth-Butterfield 
and Booth-Butterfield, 1990).
Another limitation is the relatively weak relatedness of the emotion anger in 
the related emotion group. As discussed, emotions can be more or less related 
to an object to be judged. The recalled experience of a journey was perceived as 
being only moderately related to the news story about the travel agency – which 
may have elicited (partial) emotion discounting. However, it is noteworthy that 
anger in the related-emotion group was significantly more related than anger 
in the unrelated-emotion group and that this difference led to significantly 
different judgments about the travel agency. Overall, these results support the 
validity and sufficient strength of the experimental manipulation of emotional 
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relatedness. Still, future research could aim for a stronger manipulation of relat-
edness, for instance, by adding an experimental condition with a high level of 
relatedness. This would facilitate the identification of the theoretically proposed 
interaction effect. However, it should be noted that, operationally, it is difficult 
to create high levels of emotional relatedness without simultaneously activating 
relevant cognitions, which would confound the effects of emotions. Because of 
this trade-off, we opted for a manipulation of emotional relatedness that was 
weaker but that was more likely to preclude confounding effects and ensure 
internal validity.
In the pilot, the induced anger was stronger than in the main study. This could 
be explained by the timing of the measurement. The manipulation check of the 
emotion anger was measured directly after participants described their personal 
experience. In the main study, the emotions were measured after participants 
finished answering the items measuring the dependent variables. This method 
avoided participants’ awareness of their emotions influencing their responses to 
the dependent variables. It is highly probable that in the main study, individu-
als had a similar amount of anger as they had in the pilot study, but their anger 
decreased during the study.
Overall, the present study connected psychological and communication 
research on the influence of emotional states on judgments. It particularly empha-
sized the role of a hitherto understudied boundary condition – the relatedness of 
an emotional experience to a judgment – and its interplay with processing depth. 
It suggested that emotional discounting processes may explain the differential 
effects of related and unrelated emotions. Future research should investigate 
emotional discounting more closely because it may be a prevalent phenomenon, 
particularly in media use settings, which frequently elicit related as well as unre-
lated emotions.
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